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Abstract 
The theory of evolution by natural selection has revolutionized the biological sciences yet remains 
confusing and controversial to the public at large. This study explored how a particular segment of the 
public – visitors to a natural history museum – reason about evolution in the context of an interactive 
cladogram,  or  evolutionary  tree.  The  participants  were  49  children  aged  four  to  twelve  and  one 
accompanying parent. Together, they completed five activities using a touch-screen display of the 
phylogenetic  relations  among  the  19  orders  of  mammals.  Across  activities,  participants  revealed 
similar misconceptions to those revealed by college undergraduates in previous studies. However, the 
frequency of those misconceptions was attenuated by the level of parental engagement, particularly 
the  frequency  of  turn-taking  between  parents  and  children.  Overall,  these  findings  suggest  that 
evolutionary  reasoning  may  be  improved  by  the  kinds  of  collaborative  discussions  fostered  by 
interactive  museum  displays,  so  long  as  the  affordances  of  those  displays  encourage  multi-user 
interactions. 
Keywords: Conceptual Development, Evolution Understanding, Parent-Child Conversation, Informal 
Learning Environments, Science Education. 
 
 
Introduction 
In 1996, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences identified evolution as one of five “unifying 
concepts and processes” that should be taught in all grades, from K through 12 (National 
Research Council, 1996). The rationale behind this recommendation was that “evolution is 
the central organizing principle that biologists use to understand the world. To teach biology 
without  explaining  evolution  deprives  students  of  a  powerful  concept  that  brings  great 
order and coherence to our understanding of life” (p. 3, National Research Council, 1998). 
Despite the force of this recommendation, many schools continue to fail to teach evolution 
in any grade (Griffith & Brem, 2004), and many Americans continue to deny the very fact of 
evolution, particularly human evolution (Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006; Newport, 2010). 
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One of the problems underlying, if not exacerbating, public denial of evolution is that most 
people  fail  to  understand  what  evolution  actually  is  and  how  evolution  actually  occurs 
(Shtulman  &  Calabi,  2012).  Recent  research  has  found  that  individuals  of  all  ages  and 
educational backgrounds tend to construe evolution as a kind of holistic transformation, by 
which organisms are predisposed to produce offspring more adapted to the environment 
than they were at birth (Shtulman, 2006; Shtulman & Calabi, in press). On this erroneous 
theory, the sole mechanism behind species adaptation is need: if a species needs to adapt, 
then it will adapt (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Brumby, 1984; Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, 
& Anzelmo, 2001). Selection plays no causal role on this view, which, as a result, bears more 
resemblance to pre-Darwinian theories of evolution than post-Darwinian ones (Mayr, 1982). 
Developmentally, this view appears to be an outgrowth of an early emerging “essentialist” 
construal of biological kinds, in which an organism’s outward appearance and behavior is 
determined by some kind of internal force, or “essence,” conferred from parent to child at 
birth (Gelman, 2003; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Solomon & Zaitchik, 2012). While essentialism 
may be useful for reasoning about the properties of individual organisms (e.g., Gelman & 
Coley,  1990;  Waxman,  Medin,  &  Ross,  2007),  it  has  been  shown  to  be  detrimental  for 
reasoning about the properties of entire species, as it leads students to overvalue variation 
between species and undervalue variation within a species (Nettle, 2010; Shtulman & Schulz, 
2008). As a consequence, students have difficulty understanding mechanisms of change that 
operate specifically over the variation within a species, namely, natural selection. 
To  date,  numerous  studies  have  documented  the  nature  of  students’  essentialist,  need-
based views of evolution (for reviews, see Gregory, 2009; Sinatra, Brem, & Evans, 2008). Less 
attention,  however,  has  been  paid  to  the  ways  in  which  alternative  views  of  evolution 
manifest  themselves  in  everyday  discourse  and  everyday  interactions.  The present  study 
attempted to explore this issue in the context of parent-child conversations at a natural 
history  museum.  In  particular,  we  sought  to  elicit  conversations  about  the  phenomena 
represented by one of the most canonical depictions of evolutionary change: the cladogram. 
More commonly referred to as an “evolutionary tree,” cladograms are branching diagrams 
that depict patterns of common ancestry among three or more groups of organisms, or taxa. 
A sample cladogram, depicting the evolutionary relations among primates, can be seen in 
Figure 1. 
Even though cladograms are ubiquitous in biology textbooks (Catley & Novick, 2008) and 
natural  history  museums  (Torrens  &  Barahona,  2012),  they  are  notoriously  difficult  to 
interpret, partly because they contain unfamiliar notational conventions (Novick & Catley, 
2007) and partly because they are amenable to inaccurate, essentialist interpretations of 
evolutionary change (Shtulman, 2006). Drawing on recent empirical investigations of “tree 
thinking” in introductory biology students, Gregory (2008) outlined 10 such misconceptions: 
1.  Interpreting taxa on one side of a cladogram as “higher” or “lower” than those on the 
other side. 
2.  Interpreting the longest line in a cladogram as the “main line” from which other taxa 
have deviated or side-tracked. 
3.  Inferring information about relatedness from the ordering of a cladogram’s terminal 
nodes rather than from its branches. 
4.  Interpreting  cladograms  as  representations  of  morphological  similarity  rather  than 
common ancestry. 
5.  Interpreting  some  taxa  in  a  cladogram  as  the  ancestors  of  other  taxa  rather  than 
interpreting all taxa as “siblings” or “cousins.”  
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6.  Interpreting the length of the branches in a cladogram as measures of evolutionary 
change (or lack thereof). 
7.  Inferring that the taxa on one side of a cladogram appeared, in their current form, 
earlier than those on the other side of the cladogram. 
8.  Interpreting the length of the longest branch of the cladogram as a measure of time. 
9.  Interpreting the number of intervening nodes between two taxa as a direct measure of 
their relatedness. 
10.  Interpreting  internal  nodes  in  a  cladogram  as  representing  precise  moments  of 
speciation, with little to no change occurring before or after that point in time. 
Many of the misconceptions are overlapping (e.g., 1 and 7) and some are mutually exclusive 
(e.g., 6 and 10), but all represent illegitimate inferences from the information at hand. 
As an illustration, consider the cladogram depicted in Figure 1. The only information this 
diagram provides is information about common ancestry – namely, that humans share a 
common ancestor with chimpanzees more recently than with any of the other primates, that 
humans and chimpanzees share a common ancestor with gorillas more recently than with 
any of the other primates, and so forth. Nevertheless, most people are prone to infer that: 
1.  Humans are more highly evolved than other primates. 
2.  Human evolution represents the “main line” of evolution, whereas the evolution of 
other primates represents sidetracks from this main line. 
3.  Chimpanzees are related to gorillas more closely than humans are related to gorillas 
(because the nodes of the former pair are adjacent but the nodes of the latter pair are not). 
4.  Humans  are  most  similar  to  chimpanzees  (the  closest  node  to  humans)  and  least 
similar to new world monkeys (the farthest node from humans). 
5.  Each  primate is  the  descendent  of  the  primate on  its  left  and  the  ancestor of  the 
primate on its right. 
6.  Humans have undergone the more evolutionary change than other primates (because 
their connection to the root node is longest). 
7.  Each primate appeared, in its current form, earlier than the primate to its right. 
8.  Each primate is older than the primate to its right. 
9.  Humans  are  related  to  orangutans  less  closely  than  chimpanzees  are  related  to 
orangutans (because of differences in the number of intervening nodes). 
10.  Chimpanzees came into being instantaneously at the point denoted by the rightmost 
node. 
These  inferences  are  not  just  logically  unwarranted;  they  are  also  empirically  incorrect. 
Indeed, inferences like 4 and 8 are not even meaningful on a scientific understanding of 
speciation, let alone correct or incorrect. 
Misconceptions of this nature have been documented both in the classroom (Baum, Smith, & 
Donovan, 2005; Meir, Perry, Herron, & Kingsolver, 2007) and in carefully controlled 
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Figure 1. Cladogram depicting the phylogenetic relations among seven primates (adapted 
from Gregory, 2008). 
laboratory studies (Catley, Novick, & Shade, 2010; Novick & Catley, 2007; Novick, Shade, & 
Catley,  2010).  However,  all  such  studies  have  involved  college  undergraduates,  and  no 
studies,  to  our  knowledge,  have  explored  the  prevalence  of  macroevolutionary 
misconceptions in a non-college population (though see Berti, Toneatti, & Rosati, 2010, and 
Samarapungavan  &  Wiers,  1997,  for  research  on  children’s  misconceptions  about  other 
aspects of evolution). To address this gap in the literature, we explored the prevalence of 
macroevolutionary misconceptions among preschool- and elementary-school-aged children 
visiting a natural history museum with their parents. This sample served to broaden the 
scope of inquiry not only in terms of age but also in terms of context, as each child was 
interviewed as part of a dyad with his or her parent. In other words, children’s reasoning 
about evolution was explored within the naturalistic context of a parent-child conversation. 
Previous research on parent-child conversation suggests that conversations of this type can 
be a double-edged sword, with some aspects of the conversation scaffolding learning and 
other aspects obscuring, or even obstructing, learning. For instance, Jipson and Callanan 
(2003) found that parents of preschool-aged children typically use the word “grow” in a 
literal sense, to refer to biological changes in size (e.g., “the mushroom grew taller”), but also 
occasionally use the word in a metaphorical sense, to refer to non-biological changes in size 
(e.g., “the rock grew bigger”), yielding a linguistic signal that is reliable yet noisy nonetheless. 
In a similar vein, Rigney and Callanan (2011) found that parents at a marine science center 
ascribed  biological  properties  to  typical  animals  (e.g.,  sharks)  no  more  often  than  they 
ascribed biological properties to atypical animals (e.g., anemones), potentially reinforcing 
the  inclusion  of  atypical  animals  in  the  category  of  living  things,  a  notoriously  difficult 
concept  to  acquire  (see,  e.g.,  Anggoro,  Waxman,  &  Medin,  2008).  However,  these  same 
parents  ascribed  intentional  states,  like  beliefs  and  desires,  to  both  typical  and  atypical 
animals  significantly  more  often  than  their  children  did,  thus  modeling  a  scientifically 
inappropriate form of reasoning. In short, parental input can serve as a source of accurate 
reasoning but by no means guarantees accurate reasoning (see also Gleason & Schauble, 
2000; Gunderson & Levine, 2011).  
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In the present study, we explored how parents converse with their children about evolution, 
which  we  anticipated  would  be  a  difficult  topic  for  both  parties.  We  elicited  these 
conversations by recruiting parent-child dyads from the floor of the Los Angeles Natural 
History Museum to complete a series of activities centered around an interactive cladogram. 
Two questions were of primary interest. First, how well do parent-child dyads interpret the 
information  contained  in  cladograms,  given  that  they  are  perhaps  the  most  prevalent 
representation of evolutionary change in modern culture (Torrens & Barahona, 2012) yet are 
largely misunderstood by most biology students (Catley et al., 2010)? Research by Evans et al. 
(2010)  and  Spiegel  et  al.  (2012)  suggests  that  museum  visitors  hold  a  variety  of 
preconceptions  about  micro-evolutionary  change,  some  consistent  with  the  principle  of 
natural selection (e.g., need-based reasoning) and some inconsistent with it (e.g., creationist 
reasoning). Still, it remains an open question as to how museum visitors interpret displays 
representing macro-evolutionary phenomena, such as speciation, extinction, and common 
descent. 
Second, what factors influence the accuracy of dyads’ reasoning? Three candidate factors 
were identified from prior research on shared scientific thinking: (a) the child’s gender, (b) 
the  child’s  age,  and  (c)  the  dyad’s  overall  style  of  interaction.  In  terms  of  gender,  we 
predicted  that  dyads  with  male  children  would  outperform  dyads  with  female  children, 
owing to the finding that parents are more likely to explain scientific phenomena to their 
sons than to their daughters (Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, & Allen, 2001; Diamond, 1994) 
and might thus devote more attention to their sons in the activities at hand. In terms of age, 
we predicted that dyads with older children would outperform dyads with younger children, 
owing to the finding that older children are generally more familiar with evolutionary ideas 
than younger children (Berti et al., 2010; Legare, Lane, & Evans, in press; Spiegel et al., 2012) 
and might thus comprehend the purpose of the activities more thoroughly. Finally, in terms 
of interaction style, we predicted that dyads exhibiting higher levels of collaboration would 
outperform dyads exhibiting lower levels of collaboration, owing to the finding that parents 
at a science museum tend to hone their children’s exploration of the exhibits in conceptually 
constructive ways (Crowley, Callanan, Jipson, Galco, Topping, & Shrager, 2001; Tare, French, 
Frazier,  Diamond,  &  Evans,  2011),  even  if  parents  do  occasionally  provide  conflicting  or 
confusing input. 
To  preview  our  results,  we  found  that  parent-child  dyads  espoused  the  same  kinds  of 
misconceptions documented among college-level biology students. However, the frequency 
of such misconceptions varied by dyad, with dyads exhibiting low levels of collaboration 
espousing more misconceptions than those exhibiting higher levels of collaboration. This 
effect  of  dyad  interaction  was  larger  and  more  consistent  than  any  of  the  other  effects 
documented and thus has potentially important implications for both evolution education 
and informal science learning. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 49 parent-child dyads recruited from the “Age of Mammals” exhibit at 
the Los Angeles Natural History Museum (see Figure 2A). We chose the Age of Mammals 
exhibit  because  it  is  thoroughly  grounded  in  evolutionary  findings  and  evolutionary 
principles and thus served as an ideal venue for eliciting conversations about evolution. All 
parents accompanying children between the ages of four and twelve were approached by  
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Figure 2. (A) The “Age of Mammals” exhibit at the Los Angeles Natural History Museum; (B) 
the interactive cladogram used to elicit participants’ evolutionary reasoning. 
the research team as they entered the exhibit and were invited to participate in a study. They 
were informed that the study consisted of how parents and children communicate about 
complex  biological  concepts,  like  evolution  and  common  descent.  Fifty-five  parent-child 
dyads consented to participate, but only 49 completed the entire study. The ages of the 
participating  children  were  evenly  distributed  across  the  age  range  sampled;  half  were 
between the ages of four and eight (M = 6.8, SD = 1.3, n = 24) and half were between the 
ages of nine and twelve (M = 10.3, SD = 1.0, n = 25). As for gender, 46% of the children were 
female, and 46% of the accompanying parents were female. Visitors who took part in the 
study did not receive any monetary compensation for their participation. 
A 
B  
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Procedure 
The Age of Mammals exhibit features a total of 240 biological specimens, including both 
articulated skeletons of extinct species and taxidermied specimens of extant species. The 
specimens  are  organized  into  collections  intended  to  illustrate  three  key  principles: 
“Continents move. Climates change. Mammals evolve.” These principles are also illustrated in 
the form of various touch-screen, computerized displays. One such display, an interactive 
cladogram, comprised the focus of the present study (see Figure 2B). All parent-child dyads 
who  consented  to  participate  were  taken  directly  to  the  interactive  cladogram,  briefly 
familiarized with its features and functions, and then led through a series of five activities 
exploring the information contained within. 
Technically, the display was not a “cladogram,” in the biologist’s sense of the word, because 
it attempted to represent more than just patterns of common ancestry; it also represented 
the times that taxa diverged and whether the taxa are extant or extinct. Nevertheless, we will 
refer to the display as a cladogram because its primary function was to depict patterns of 
common  ancestry.  Five  display-based  activities  were  designed  to  probe  participants’ 
understanding of macroevolution and the ways in which macroevolutionary relations are 
represented in cladograms. These activities, which were derived from previous research on 
students’ macroevolutionary misconceptions (e.g.,  Catley et al., 2010;  Gregory, 2008), are 
described  below  in  relation  to  participants’  actual  responses.  All  responses  were  video 
recorded and transcribed at a later date. At the completion of the five-activity interview, 
participants were encouraged to explore other areas of the exhibit, but their conversations at 
those other areas were not recorded. 
Coding 
Measures of engagement. Each interview was transcribed by two independent coders, the 
first  producing  a  written  record  of  all  utterances  and  actions  and  the  second  editing or 
embellishing that record to account for details the first coder appeared to have missed. The 
coders then summed the number of distinct utterances and actions for each dyad member 
and  each  activity,  resulting  in  490  engagement  scores  (5  scores  per  participant  for  98 
participants).  Any  self-contained  thought,  question,  or  response  was  coded  as  a  distinct 
utterance, even if that thought did not take the form of a complete sentence (e.g., “yes” or 
“OK” were counted as distinct utterances). Likewise, any attempt to deliberately manipulate 
the  display  (via  tapping  or  scrolling),  or  manipulate  a  partner’s  view  of  the  display  (via 
pointing  or waving),  was  coded  as  a  distinct  action.  Extended  sequences of  dialogue or 
activity were broken into distinct utterances and actions, with the exception of experimenter 
requested actions (e.g., “point to the monkey, the tree shrew, and the flying lemur”), which 
were counted simply as one action so as not to inflate engagement scores for some activities 
relative to others. Coders agreed on their tabulation of distinct utterances and actions 93% of 
the time, and all disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Measures of accuracy.  Participants’  responses  to  each  activity  were  assigned  a  score  that 
ranged from -1 to +2. Responses that revealed a positive misconception about the material 
at  hand  received  a  score  of  -1.  Responses  that  were  vague,  ambiguous,  or  equivocal 
(including “don’t know” responses) received a score of 0. Responses that revealed a partial 
understanding of the material at hand received a score of +1. And responses that revealed a 
full understanding of the material at hand received a score of +2. What constituted a correct 
response  or  an  incorrect  response  is  discussed  below  in  relation  to  the  corresponding 
activity. It should be noted that each dyad received a single score per activity, rather than 
separate scores for each dyad member, as almost all dyads offered a single response by the  
International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education Vol.5, Issue 1, 27-46, 2012 
 
34 
 
conclusion  of  almost  all  activities.  Two  coders  independently  assigned  scores  to  all  245 
responses (5 responses per dyad for 49 dyads). Overall agreement was 82% (Cohen’s κ = .76), 
and all disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Results 
How well do parent-child dyads reason about evolutionary phenomena? 
Below we describe each activity used to elicit participants’ evolutionary reasoning and the 
nature of their responses, followed by an analysis of participants’ engagement with each 
activity and how that engagement was related to response accuracy per activity (summed 
across  dyads).  We  address  the  question  of  whether,  and  how,  engagement  influenced 
response accuracy per dyad (summed across activities) in the following section. 
Activity  1:  Ordering.  The  introductory  screen  of  the  interactive  cladogram  featured  all  19 
orders of mammals, arranged in a semicircle with primates in the center (see Figure 2B). The 
first activity was designed to elicit participants’ beliefs about the necessity, and potential 
flexibility, of this particular ordering. As mentioned previously, the ordering of the taxa in a 
cladogram  is,  to  a  large  extent,  arbitrary.  While  taxa  that  share  a  most  recent  common 
ancestor must be adjacent (e.g., chimpanzees and humans), their ordering relative to one 
another is arbitrary (i.e., chimpanzees can be on the left and humans on the right or humans 
can  be  on  the  left  and  chimpanzees  on  the  right).  The  representation  of  nested  taxa  is 
governed by the same constraint, meaning that entire groups of taxa can be swapped with 
one another so long as the underlying branching relations are preserved. Thus, any one 
taxon could appear at any point in the row of terminal nodes, and any cluster of taxa could 
be reordered in many different ways. 
We attempted to elicit participants’ understanding of the ordinal relations among taxa by 
asking them to locate three particular taxa – the monkey, the tree shrew, and the flying 
lemur – and reflect on the ordering of those taxa. Specifically, we asked, “Does it matter that 
the flying lemur is on the left, the tree shrew is in the middle, and the monkey is on the right? 
Or could they be reordered so that the monkey is on the left, the flying lemur is in the 
middle, and the tree shrew is on the right? Why or why not?” 
Because lemurs and shrews share a common ancestor with each other more recently than 
either  shares  with  monkeys  (as  depicted  by  the  relevant  branching  relations),  the  only 
constraint on ordering was that the lemur and the shrew had to be adjacent, which was true 
of  the  hypothetical  ordering  we  asked  participants  to  consider.  Nevertheless,  17  dyads 
claimed that the taxa could not be reordered, justifying their judgment with an affirmation 
that ordering matters (scored -1). Most dyads (n = 23) were unsure whether or not the taxa 
could  be  reordered  (scored  0),  and  only  a  few  dyads  (n =  9)  claimed  the  taxa  could  be 
reordered but were unable to provide an adequate justification for their judgment (scored 
+1). None of the dyads provided both a correct judgment (that the taxa could be reordered) 
and a correct justification (that only the branching relations matter), and thus none received 
a score of +2. On the contrary, dyads that received a score of 0 or 1 seemed genuinely unsure 
of whether, and how, the ordinal properties of the display reflected information about the 
species’ evolutionary origins. 
Activity 2: Branching. Participants’ understanding of the branching relations in a cladogram 
was elicited more directly in the second activity. Participants were asked to locate two non-
placental mammals – the kangaroo and the platypus – and to read about their features in a 
pop-up window that appeared upon touching each. We chose non-placental mammals as 
our target taxa for this activity because their divergence from the other mammals occurred 
earliest (around 170 million years ago for egg-laying mammals and 130 million years ago for  
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marsupials) and was thus highly salient. After participants had read about the features of 
kangaroos and platypuses, they were asked, “How are these two mammals different from the 
other mammals in the tree? Is this difference reflected in the tree itself somehow?” 
Most dyads were able to identify a genuine morphological or geographic difference between 
the non-placental mammals and the other mammals (e.g., “only kangaroos have pouches 
and only platypuses lay eggs,” “they’re the only ones that live in Australia”), but very few 
were able to identify how that difference was reflected in the tree. Six dyads claimed the 
difference  was  not  reflected  in  the  tree  (scored  -1);  15  dyads  claimed  they  were  unsure 
whether or not the difference was reflected in the tree (scored 0); and 23 dyads claimed the 
difference was reflected in the tree but did not refer to the branching relations, e.g., “they 
[the labels] are different colors” or “they [the animals] just look different” (scored +1). Only 5 
dyads correctly identified the branching relations as the relevant form of representation, e.g., 
“this one’s branching out, completely separate from these” (scored +2). 
Activity 3: Speciation. One of the unique features of the interactive cladogram was a slider at 
the bottom of the screen for manipulating the timeline, allowing users to scroll between the 
beginning of the divergence of the 19 orders of mammals (65 million years ago) and the 
present day. Moving back in time “shrank” the cladogram such that branching events that 
occurred after that time no longer appeared on the screen. We used this feature of the 
display  to  elicit  participants’  beliefs  about  the  origin  of  species.  Specifically,  we  asked 
participants to move the slider to 40 million years, which caused the taxon representing an 
extinct, hippo-like creature – the paleoparadoxiid – to disappear from the screen. We then 
asked, “Did you see that the paleoparadoxiid disappeared from the tree? Why do you think 
that happened? What might have occurred between 40 million years ago and 30 million 
years ago that led to the appearance of paleoparadoxiid?” 
Of  interest  was  whether  participants  could  identify  a  biologically  plausible  cause  of 
divergence – i.e., geographic isolation, reproductive isolation, or unique selection pressures. 
Five dyads did, in fact, cite such a factor, e.g., “maybe the climate changed” (+2). Fourteen 
dyads noted that the paleoparadoxiid must have evolved during the time period of interest 
but were unclear on what factors may have driven its divergence from its closest relative 
(scored  +1).  The  majority  of  dyads  (n  =  21)  were  unsure  of  what  the  appearance  and 
disappearance of the paleoparadoxiid icon was supposed to represent biologically (scored 
0), and the remaining dyads (n = 9) acknowledged that the appearance and disappearance of 
the paleoparadoxiid icon was intended to represent a speciation event but cited biological 
implausible means of speciation, e.g., “the sea cow and the hyrax had a baby” or “it came 
from the ground” (scored -2). 
Activity 4: Relatedness. Another unique feature of the interactive cladogram was that users 
could “launch the story” of a particular taxon, which opened a window containing detailed 
information  about  the  taxon’s  habitat,  diet,  and  morphology.  Also  contained  in  these 
windows were additional cladograms, depicting the relations among other species within 
the taxa not explicitly depicted in the main display. We used this feature as a vehicle for 
eliciting  participants’  understanding  of  the  relatedness  of  species  whose  morphological 
features seemingly belie their evolutionary origins: camels, pigs, and whales. Participants 
were  asked  to  “launch  the  story”  for  the  camels,  which  then  brought  up  a  cladogram 
depicting pigs on the left, camels in the middle, and whales on the right. The branching 
relations among these taxa indicated that camels are more closely related to whales than to 
pigs; the outward behavior and morphology of these animals, however, would suggest that 
camels are more closely related to pigs. Faced with this tension, participants were asked to 
determine whether camels were more closely related to pigs or to whales and to explain how  
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they were able to discern that fact from the tree. The story itself, we should note, did not 
explicitly reference this tension, nor did it give participants any clues as to which of the three 
species were most closely related. 
The vast majority of dyads (n = 39) claimed that the tree indicated that camels are more 
closely related to pigs than to whales (scored -1). Three dyads claimed not to be able to 
discern  what  the  tree  indicated  about  relatedness  (scored  0);  four  claimed  that  the  tree 
indicated that camels are more closely related to whales but were unable to explain how it 
indicated that (scored +1); and three claimed the tree indicated that camels are more closely 
related to whales and were also able to justify that inference by reference to the branching 
relations (scored +2). 
Activity 5: Extinction. The interactive cladogram contained another feature not represented in 
standard cladograms: it allowed participants to select images of the specimens on view next 
to the display and learn about those specimens in the context of the phylogenic relations 
and historical timeline contained within. We used this feature to elicit participants’ reasoning 
about the relation between extinct species and extant species. Participants were asked to 
navigate  to  the  “Mammals  on  Display”  tab,  select  the  “entelodont”  (an  extinct,  pig-like 
creature), and decide (a) whether it still exists and (b) where it might fit in the cladogram in 
the main display. The entelodont’s status as an extinct species could be discerned from the 
sliding timeline at the bottom of the screen, which made the entelodont non-selectable if 
moved to a point past its estimated date of extinction. It could also be discerned from the 
information contained in the pop-up window describing the species. Thus, the question of 
whether or not the entelodont is extinct was of less interest than the question of where it 
might fit in the cladogram, which depicted 19 extant species but only one extinct species 
(the paleoparadoxiid). 
As expected, virtually all dyads were able to discern that the entelodont is extinct. Only 19 
dyads, however, were able to discern that it would be located among the ungulates (scored 
+2). Twenty-two dyads indicated that the entelodont would be located in some other part of 
the display, typically the bottom, near the cladogram’s root (scored +1); 6 dyads were unsure 
of  where  the  entelodont  would  be  located  (scored  0);  and  2  dyads  claimed  that  the 
entelodont  would  not  fit  into  the  cladogram  because  it  was  extinct  and  extinct  species 
cannot be represented in cladograms (scored -1). 
Patterns of engagement. Participants’ engagement with each activity was operationalized as 
the number of distinct utterances and actions produced during that activity. Engagement 
scores were calculated separately for each dyad member and each activity. To determine 
whether engagement scores varied by activity or by dyad composition, we ran a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the engagement scores in which activity (ordering, 
branching, speciation, relatedness, extinction) and dyad member (parent, child) were treated 
as  within-participants  variables  and  parent’s  gender  (male, female),  child’s  gender  (male, 
female),  and  child’s  age  (4-8,  9-12)  were  treated  as  between-participants  variables.  This 
analysis revealed significant effects of activity (F(4,164) = 5.08, p < .01) and dyad member 
(F(1,41) = 30.74, p < .001), but no significant effects of parent’s gender, child’s gender, or 
child’s age and no significant interactions either. 
The effects of activity and dyad member on engagement scores are illustrated in Figure 3A. 
While dyads produced more utterances and actions for some activities (e.g., branching) than 
for others (e.g., extinction), this effect was small in comparison to the effect of dyad member. 
Across activities, the mean engagement score for children was 4.6 (SD = 1.4, range = 1.2 to 
8.8), whereas the mean engagement score for parents was only 1.8 (SD = 2.5, range = 0 to 
11.6). In fact, 27 of the 49 parents produced fewer than one utterance or action per activity,  
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despite the fact that the interview was framed, in both verbal and written communications, 
as  “a  study  of  how  parents  and  children  converse  about  complex  biological  topics,  like 
evolution and common descent.” The remaining 22 parents, however, tended to produce as 
many utterances and actions as their children, if not more. This variance, while unexpected, 
ultimately  proved  fruitful  in  determining  how  engagement  scores  related  to  response 
accuracy at the level of the dyad (discussed subsequently). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. (A) Mean number of utterances/actions per activity per dyad member; (B) Mean 
accuracy of dyad responses per activity (+ SE). EXT = Extinction, SPE = Speciation, REL = 
Relatedness, ORD = Ordering, BRA = Branching. 
Patterns of reasoning. Participants’ mean accuracy on each activity is displayed in Figure 3B, 
ordered  by  the  mean  level  of  engagement  with  those  activities.  A  repeated-measures 
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ANOVA revealed not only that accuracy scores differed by activity (F(4,192) = 34.43, p < .01) 
but also that accuracy scores were quadratically related to mean engagement scores (F(1,48) 
= 96.41, p < .001, for the quadratic contrast). The source of this quadratic relation is not 
entirely clear, though one possibility is that the association between accuracy scores and 
engagement scores may have been moderated by a third variable – task difficulty – such that 
engagement was negatively correlated with response accuracy for easy tasks but positively 
correlated with response accuracy for harder tasks. Put differently, increased engagement 
may have been productive for the more difficult tasks but counterproductive for the easier 
ones. 
We did not, however, collect any independent measures of task difficulty, so this speculation 
requires  further  verification.  Nevertheless,  the  two  activities  that  differed  most  in 
engagement  –  activity  5  (extinction)  and  activity  2  (branching)  –  yielded  opposite 
correlations between accuracy scores and engagement scores at the level of the dyad. Dyads 
who  exhibited  more  engagement  with  the  branching  activity  tended  to  produce  more 
accurate  responses  (r  =  .27),  whereas  dyads  who  exhibited  more  engagement  with  the 
extinction activity tended to produce less accurate responses (r = -.20). These correlations 
were not significantly different from zero (given the small sample size), but they were still 
significantly  different  from  one  another  (z  =  3.25,  p  <  .01),  suggesting  that  the  relation 
between engagement and accuracy may differ depending on the conceptual demands of 
the task. 
What factors influenced accuracy of reasoning? 
Dyads differed substantially in the accuracy of their reasoning, from providing responses 
scored -1 on four of the five activities to providing responses scored +2 on four of the five 
activities. To determine which factors, if any, were associated with accuracy, we regressed 
each dyad’s accuracy score against five dyad-specific measures: the child’s age (in years), the 
child’s gender (0 = female, 1 = male), the parent’s gender (0 = female, 1 = male), the parent’s 
mean  engagement  score,  and  the  child’s  mean  engagement  score.  Only  two  measures 
emerged as significant predictors of response accuracy: the child’s age (β = .32, t = 2.39, p < 
.05) and the parent’s mean engagement score (β = .36, t = 2.61, p < .05). These effects are 
displayed in Figure 4, with child’s age dichotomized as “younger” (4-8) and “older” (9-12) and 
parent’s engagement scores dichotomized as “low” (M < 1 utterance or action per activity) 
and “high” (M > 1 utterance or action per activity). Dyads with older children produced more 
accurate  responses  than  dyads  with  younger  children,  and  dyads  with  high  parental 
engagement  scores  produced  more  accurate  responses  than  dyads  with  low  parental 
engagement scores. A univariate ANOVA revealed no interaction between child’s age and 
parental  engagement  (F(1,45)  <  1,  ns),  though  it  did  reveal  that  the  effect  of  parental 
engagement (η
2 = .13) was nearly three times as large as the effect of child’s age (η
2 = .05). 
To explore the effect of parental engagement further, we computed an additional measure 
of  engagement:  the  number  of  alternations  between  the  child’s  contribution  to  the 
conversation (utterance or action) and the parent’s contribution. While this measure was 
strongly correlated with our initial measure of parental engagement (r = .74), it was not 
entirely redundant with that measure. Figure 5 illustrates how the two measures diverged. 
The transcript shown in 5A contains multiple alternations between parent and child, with 
parent  A  actively  eliciting  information  from  the  child,  either  from  the  display  or  from 
memory. The transcript shown in 5B, on the other hand, contains far fewer alternations, with 
parent B generally dominating the conversation. While parents in both dyads produced a 
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Figure 4. Mean accuracy of dyad responses (+ SE) as a function of parental engagement (low 
vs. high) and child’s age (younger vs. older). 
similar number of utterances or actions per activity (M for parent A = 5.0, M for parent B = 
4.8), the two dyads received very different alteration scores (M for dyad A = 4.8, M for dyad B 
= 1.8). It should be noted that dyads A and B were two of only 33 dyads for which alternation 
scores  could  be  computed  at  all.  The  remaining  16  dyads  included  too  little  parental 
engagement, typically because the parents in these dyads resigned themselves to simply 
watching  their  children  complete  the  activities.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  overall 
paucity of parental involvement rendered the use of more detailed, content-specific coding 
schemes (like those used by Crowley et al., 2001, or Evans et al., 2010) impractical. 
Among  the  33  dyads  for  which  alternations  could  be  computed,  the  mean  number  of 
alternations was 14.2 (SD = 10.7, range = 2 to 44), and alternations were strongly correlated 
with response accuracy (r = .55). Alternations actually proved to be a stronger predictor of 
response accuracy than parental engagement in general (r = .35). But were alternations a 
unique predictor of response accuracy? We addressed this question by submitting dyads’ 
mean accuracy scores to a hierarchical regression in which alternation scores were entered 
subsequent to parental engagement scores. Whereas parental engagement scores explained 
14%  of  the  variance  in  response  accuracy  in  the  initial  model  (F(1,31)  =  5.00,  p  <  .05), 
alternation  scores  explained  an  additional  17%  of  variance  in  the  subsequent  model  (F-
change(2,30) = 6.69, p < .01). In fact, the partial correlation between alternation scores and 
response accuracy, controlling for parental engagement scores, was nearly as large as the 
zero-order correlation between these two variables (r = .44, p < .01), whereas the partial 
correlation  between  parental  engagement  scores  and  response  accuracy,  controlling  for 
alternation scores, was no longer significant (r = .06, ns). The nature of parental engagement 
thus appeared to be more important than the mere act of engagement. 
 
 
Older  
Younger 
M
e
a
n
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y
 
0.0
-0.5
1.0
0.5
2.0
1.5
-1.0
Low  High 
Parental Engagement  
International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education Vol.5, Issue 1, 27-46, 2012 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Examples of high parental engagement involving (a) frequent alternations and (b) 
infrequent  alternations  between  parent  and  child  contributions.  E  =  Experimenter,  P  = 
Parent, and C = Child. Actions are denoted in brackets. 
Conclusions 
Evolutionary concepts like speciation, extinction, and common descent are notoriously difficult 
to  understand  (Gregory,  2008;  Shtulman,  2006),  and  canonical  representations  of  those 
concepts are notoriously difficult to interpret (Catley et al., 2010; Novick et al., 2010). The 
A  E:  Select the kangaroo and the platypus and read about their features. 
 
P:  Can you find the kangaroo? 
C:  [Hits the kangaroo] 
P:  [Reads it to her] OK, now the platypus. You keep looking over it. 
C:  [Hits the kangaroo] 
P:  [Reads it to her] 
 
E:  How are these two mammals different from the other mammals in the 
tree? 
 
P:  Where do their babies grow? 
C:  In their pouch. 
P:  Right, what about the platypus? 
C:  I don’t know. 
P:  Remember it lays eggs, now where do they come from? 
C:  Australia and New Guinea. 
 
E:  Is this difference reflected in the tree itself somehow? 
P:  By the colors. 
B  E:  Select the kangaroo and the platypus and read about their features. 
 
P:  Kangaroo and platypus. 
C:  [Leans on display looks around] 
P:  OK, here’s the kangaroo and the platypus. 
C:  [Reads them] 
P:  OK, now this one, most other mammals don’t lay eggs, but the platypus is 
a mammal that lays eggs. That’s a big deal, will you remember that? 
 
E:  How are these two mammals different from the other mammals in the 
tree? 
 
P:  Well, the platypus lays eggs and live in the water, and the kangaroo has a 
pouch and keeps their young in the pouch. 
 
E:  Is this difference reflected in the tree itself somehow? 
 
P:  Well, they are all mammals, but [points to tree, sweeping motion]. Hmm. 
It’s obvious about the platypus...  
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present study sought to determine how parents and children discuss such concepts and 
interpret such representations in the context of an interactive museum display. We found 
that  parents  and  children,  like  the  college-aged  students  tested  in  previous  research, 
exhibited significant difficulty in interpreting the core feature of a cladogram – namely, the 
branching relations among its taxa. Parents and children also revealed the same kinds of 
evolutionary  misconceptions  documented  in  previous  research,  including  (a)  that  the 
ordering of a species in a cladogram carries biologically relevant information, (b) that the 
morphological overlap between species is a reliable indicator of shared ancestry, and (c) that 
speciation  occurs  through  a  kind  of  instantaneous  transformation  or  emergence. 
Nevertheless,  the  frequency  of  those  misconceptions  was  negatively  correlated  with  the 
degree to which parents were involved in generating a response, particularly the degree of 
turn-taking between parents and children. The more often the two collaborated (by this 
measure), the more often they generated accurate interpretations and explanations of the 
phenomena at hand. 
These findings have implications for both the study of evolutionary reasoning and the design 
of informal learning environments. With respect to evolutionary reasoning, they suggest that 
collaboration  may  be  an  effective  means  of  reducing,  or  even  eliminating,  evolutionary 
misconceptions.  Previous  research  by  Asterhan  and  Schwartz  (2007,  2008)  found  that 
undergraduates who answered evolution-based problems on their own learned less about 
evolution, in both the short-term and the long-term, than those who worked in pairs. They 
also found that the style of a dyad’s interaction influenced learning such that dyads who 
engaged in argumentation exhibited greater learning gains than those who merely shared 
information. Assuming that turn-taking between parents and children served as a proxy for 
argumentation, the present study not only replicates Asterhan and Schwartz’s findings but 
also extends those findings to (a) populations of different ages and (b) conversations elicited 
in more naturalistic contexts. 
That said, the studies by Asterhan and Schwartz employed controls absent from the present 
study, including the provision of instruction on how to conduct a critical discussion and the 
administration of pre- and post-intervention measures of evolution understanding. Controls 
like  these  are  difficult  to  implement  in  a  museum  setting,  where  participants’  time  and 
attention are limited resources. It may thus be beneficial to test parent-child dyads in a more 
controlled (laboratory) setting, particularly for the purpose of assessing learning. While we 
did,  in  fact,  document  a  strong  relation  between  the  level  of  interaction  between  dyad 
members  and  the  accuracy  of  their  responses,  it  is  unclear  whether  greater  dyadic 
interaction was a cause, or merely a symptom, of more accurate responding. Dyads who 
entered  the  museum  with  better  evolution  understanding  may  have  engaged  in  more 
discussion simply because they were more familiar, or more comfortable, with the topics at 
hand. 
At least two considerations militate against this interpretation, however. First, not all forms of 
engagement were associated with higher response accuracy. Children’s engagement scores, 
for instance, were uncorrelated with response accuracy, as were parental engagement scores 
after controlling for parent-child alternations. Second, engagement was positively correlated 
with response accuracy for some activities but negatively correlated with others. Still, future 
research should explore the effects of parent-child interaction on learning more directly by 
including  both  pretests  and  posttests  and  by  administering  them  (separately)  to  both 
parents and children. 
With respect to informal learning environments, our findings suggest that environments that 
encourage dyadic interaction – particularly parent-child interaction – may be more effective  
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at fostering learning than those that encourage more monadic forms of exploration. These 
findings echo many other findings in the science education literature. Van Schijndel, Franse, 
and Raijmakers (2010), for instance, found that children who were actively coached by their 
parents during a museum visit engaged more effectively with the exhibits than children who 
were not coached in this way. Tenenbaum, Prior, Dowling, and Frost’s (2010) found that 
parent-child dyads who explored a museum with a booklet of activities spent more time 
exploring  and  discussing  the  exhibits  than  dyads  who  explored  the  museum  in  a  less 
structured way. And Tare et al. (2011) found that parents’ explanatory behavior at a museum 
exhibit was positively correlated with their children’s explanatory behavior. Two aspects of 
our findings, however, stand in contrast to these earlier findings. 
First, the relation between dyads’ level of engagement and accuracy of reasoning was not 
entirely straightforward. Dyads reasoned most accurately for activities in which they were 
either most engaged or least engaged; intermediate levels of engagement were, on the other 
hand, associated with the poorest performance (see Figure 3). Whatever the cause of this 
effect may be, the effect itself implies that increased engagement is not always productive or 
beneficial and that learners may need additional guidance in how to allocate their attention 
to the displays at hand (see, e.g., Allen & Gutwill, 2004). 
Second, we did not explicitly instruct parents on how to engage with their children during 
the activities, leaving open the option that parents might chose not to engage at all, and, to 
our  surprise,  approximately  half  adopted  that  option.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that 
what led to such high levels of parental attrition was not confusion about the purpose of the 
study but the nature of the touch-screen display, which was clearly designed for a single 
user. If two users touched the screen at the same time, then either the cursor on the display 
would toggle between the two points of contact or the display would reset itself altogether, 
closing  all  pop-up  windows  and  restoring  all  default  settings  (e.g.,  restoring  the  sliding 
timescale to “present day”). Dyads quickly became aware of this contingency and delegated 
the task of manipulating the display to a single individual, typically the child. As a result, 
many parents seemed to become increasingly disengaged over the course of the interview, 
an observation backed by a significant drop in parental engagement scores from the first 
activity to the last (M = 1.9, 2.6, 2.0, 1.4, 1.0; linear contrast: F(1,48) = 12.33, p < .01). This 
unexpected finding highlights a paradox in the use of touch-screen displays increasingly 
populating the halls of science museums today: such displays are typically designed for a 
single user, yet, in our study, dyads in which a single member was actively engaged with the 
display  profited  less  from  the  display  than  those  in  which  both  members  were  actively 
engaged. 
The conceptual benefits of collaborative activity over solitary activity have been documented 
in a variety of studies (e.g., Craig, Chi, & VanLehn, 2009; Okada & Simon, 1997, Schwarz, 
Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000). The mechanism behind this effect appears to be the addition of 
a “social impetus” to explain and justify one’s reasoning. Museum displays that can capture 
or  create  this  kind  of  impetus  would  thus  seem  to  be  more  efficacious  than  those  that 
cannot. That said, the design of such displays is constrained by additional, pragmatic factors 
that might effectively limit interactivity, including how long visitors can be expected to use 
the display, how well visitors can discern the purpose of the display’s affordances, and how 
constructively visitors can intervene on the phenomena of interest (Allen & Gutwill, 2004). 
Which  considerations  to  privilege  over  others  is  a  question  that  likely  merits  a  different 
answer  for  every  display.  Still,  our  research  suggests  that,  at  a  minimum,  touch-screen 
displays should be tolerant of multiple points of contact so that parents and children may 
jointly  interact  with  the  display  without  accidentally  erasing  one  another’s  paths  of 
exploration.  
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In  conclusion,  visitors  to  a  science  museum  are  no  more  immune  to  evolutionary 
misconceptions  than  other  populations.  Science  museums,  however,  provide  unique 
opportunities for collaboratively discussing evolutionary phenomena, and such discussions 
appear to help attenuate evolutionary misconceptions. While further research needs to be 
done on how parent-child conversations foster accurate evolutionary reasoning and whether 
such conversations lead to long-term learning, the current findings point to a promising new 
method for increasing evolution understanding among the general public. 
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